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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
For this installment of the Recent Developments, we examine one
recent United States Supreme Court decision, two cases recently argued before the U.S. Supreme Court, and two recent U.S. Courts of
Appeals decisions. Note One examines Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 1 where the U.S. Supreme Court examined the propriety of a
punitive damages award in tobacco litigation where the award considered harm to nonlitigant third parties. 2 Note Two examines Hein
v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 3 a taxpayer standing case
recently argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. 4 Note Three examines Frederick v. Morse, 5 another recently argued case, which involves high school students’ First Amendment rights. 6 Note Four examines Leonard v Robinson, 7 a Sixth Circuit decision discussing the
First Amendment right not to be arrested for speaking angrily at a
town meeting. 8 Finally, Note Five examines Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
(Hamdan 2), 9 where the D.C. Circuit Court continued the contentious litigation between Hamdan and the U.S. government. 10

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
Andrew Collinson contributed this Note.
127 S. Ct. 722 (2006).
Stephanie Tañada contributed this Note.
439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006).
Jeremy W. Harris contributed this Note.
477 F.3d 347(6th Cir. 2007).
Noah Nadler contributed this Note.
464 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006).
Brian Sites contributed this Note.
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TORT LAW—PUNITIVE DAMAGES—A PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD
BASED ON A JURY’S DESIRE TO PUNISH A DEFENDANT FOR HARMING
NONPARTIES AMOUNTS TO A TAKING OF PROPERTY FROM THE
DEFENDANT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS—Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
In a state negligence and deceit lawsuit, an Oregon jury found
that Jesse Williams’ death was caused by smoking and that petitioner Philip Morris, the manufacturer of the cigarettes Williams
smoked, knowingly and falsely led him to believe that smoking was
safe. 11 During the trial the jury was asked to consider how many
other people had been deceived by Philip Morris in the State of Oregon over the past forty years. 12 As a result, the jury awarded Williams’ estate $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in
punitive damages. 13 On appeal by Philip Morris, the United States
Supreme Court vacated the ruling by the Oregon Supreme Court,
holding that the Due Process Clause forbids a jury from basing a punitive damages award upon its desire to punish the defendant for
harming persons who are not a party to the lawsuit. 14 The Court held
that such punitive damages amount to a taking of property from the
defendant without due process. 15
This lawsuit arose out of the death of Jesse Williams, a heavy
cigarette smoker. 16 Respondent, Williams’ widow, represented his estate in this state lawsuit for negligence and deceit against Philip
Morris, the manufacturer of the cigarettes that Williams had preferred. 17 An Oregon jury found that Williams’ death had been caused
by smoking, that Williams had smoked because he had thought it
safe to do so, and that Philip Morris knowingly and falsely encouraged Williams to believe in the safety of its product. 18 The jury further found that Philip Morris was negligent and had engaged in deceit. 19 As a result of this finding, the jury awarded punitive damages
in a nearly 100 to 1 ratio to compensatory damages. 20
The trial judge, citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 21
found the punitive damages to be excessive and reduced the award to
$32 million. 22 Both sides appealed the ruling, and the Oregon Court
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060-61 (2007).
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Id. at 1060.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1060-61.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Id.
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
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of Appeals rejected Philip Morris’ arguments and restored the jury
award to $79.5 million. 23 Philip Morris immediately appealed to the
Oregon Supreme Court, which denied review; the company then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was
granted. 24 In light of its decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 25 the Court remanded the case. 26
On review in the Oregon Supreme Court, Philip Morris argued
that the trial court should have read a proposed punitive damages
instruction to the jury specifically instructing the jury that it could
not seek to punish Philip Morris for injury to persons not party to the
lawsuit. 27 In refusing to give such an instruction to the jury, Philip
Morris argued that there was a “significant likelihood” that a portion
of the $79.5 million award represented punishment for harming others in addition to Williams and that this was forbidden by the Due
Process Clause. 28 The Oregon Supreme Court rejected Philip Morris’
arguments, finding that the Constitution does not prohibit a state
jury from “using punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm to
nonparties.” 29 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to Philip
Morris to consider whether Oregon had unconstitutionally permitted
Philip Morris to be punished for harming nonparty victims. 30
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer ruled, “[T]he Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages
award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts
upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation.” 31 The
reasoning for this stems from the Due Process prohibition against
punishing an individual without first providing the individual with
“an opportunity to present every available defense.”32 To Breyer, permitting punishment for injury to nonparty victims allows the defendant

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
26. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1175 (2006).
30. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1062. Philip Morris had further argued that the punitive
damages award was “grossly excessive” in light of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 416-17 (2003). While the Supreme Court also granted certiorari on the question
of whether Oregon had disregarded “the constitutional requirement that punitive damages
be reasonably related to the plaintiff’s harm,” the Court ended up considering only whether
the punishment for harm to nonparty victims was constitutional, as remand of this case
could lead to a new trial or change in the amount of punitive damages awarded. Williams,
127 S. Ct. at 1061-62, 1065.
31. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
32. Id. (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)).
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no opportunity to defend against the charge by showing how other victims were not entitled to damages because of their own negligence.33
Of additional concern to the Court was that permitting punishment for the injury of nonparty victims “would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation.” 34 The questions of
how many victims, the seriousness of injury, and the circumstances
of each victim’s injury would not likely be answered during a trial,
leaving the jury to speculate as to appropriate damages. 35 Thus,
wrote Breyer, “the fundamental due process concerns to which our
punitive damages cases refer—risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty and
lack of notice—will be magnified.” 36
While punitive damages may not be awarded for injury to nonparties, the majority made clear that the Due Process Clause does not
preclude evidence of harm to nonparties from being introduced for
the purpose of demonstrating reprehensibility. 37 According to Justice
Breyer, “[e]vidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show
that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial
risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible . . . .” 38 However, such evidence is to be used in determining
whether an award is ultimately justified or excessive and may not be
used by the jury to punish a defendant for harm alleged to have been
inflicted on nonparties. 39 Thus, the majority wrote, “the Due Process
Clause requires States to provide assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm caused strangers.”40
The error in the Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion, the majority
held, was that it focused on more than reprehensibility in upholding
the punitive damages award. 41 In rejecting Philip Morris’ claim that
the Constitution forbids the use of punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm to nonparties, the Oregon court made three statements. 42 The majority found that the first statement—that the Court
in State Farm had held only that a jury could not base an award on
dissimilar acts of a defendant—was correct, but held that a jury may
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)).
37. Id. at 1064.
38. Id.
39. Id. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75 (excessiveness decision depends upon the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, whether the award bears a reasonable relationship
to the actual and potential harm caused by the defendant to the plaintiff, and the difference between the award and sanctions “authorized or imposed in comparable cases”).
40. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1064-65.

2007]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1275

not punish for harm to others. 43 The majority disagreed with the second statement—that if a jury cannot punish for the conduct, there is
no reason to consider it—because while the Due Process Clause prohibits punishment for harm to nonparties, it permits a jury to consider such harm in determining reprehensibility. The third statement—that it is difficult to see how a jury could consider harm to
nonparties without using that consideration in determining punishment—raises the practical problem of knowing what the jury was
thinking when it imposed its punishment. 44 The answer the majority
endorsed is that “state courts cannot authorize procedures that create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of any such confusion occurring.” 45 Although States have some flexibility in determining
what kind of procedures to implement in protecting against the
risk of confusion, “federal constitutional law obligates them to
provide some form of protection” where the “risk of . . . misunderstanding is a significant one.” 46
The principle dissent by Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority’s
approach, finding that it unnecessarily vacated the judgment of the
Oregon Supreme Court, which had “deprive[d] [no jury] of proper legal guidance” and had “endeavored to follow our decisions.” 47 Ginsburg expressed her belief that the Court had identified no charge by
the Oregon courts inconsistent with the allowable scope of reprehensibility in determining punitive damages and thus should not have
overturned the Oregon ruling. 48 Furthermore, Ginsburg argued, in
making its decision, “the Court reaches outside the bounds of the
case as postured when the trial court entered its judgment.” 49 Accordingly, Ginsburg wrote, “I would accord more respectful treatment
to the proceedings and dispositions of state courts that sought diligently to adhere to our changing, less than crystalline precedent.”50
While joining Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, Justice Thomas wrote a
one-paragraph dissent separately to emphasize his view that “the
Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages
awards.” 51 To Thomas, it did not matter that the Court called the ruling “procedural,” as “the ‘procedural’ rule is simply a confusing im-

43. Id. at 1065.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1069.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429-30 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
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plementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has
created for punitive damages.” 52
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens wrote that he saw “no reason why” the harm of persons not before the court “should not be
taken into consideration when assessing the appropriate sanction for
reprehensible conduct.” 53 To Stevens, “punitive damages are a sanction for the public harm the defendant’s conduct has caused or
threatened.” In Stevens’ view, “[t]here is little difference between the
justification for a criminal sanction, such as a fine or term of imprisonment, and an award of punitive damages.”54
Justice Stevens pointed to the difference between compensatory
and punitive damages when dealing with third parties. 55 He noted
that in this case no party argued for punitive damages to be used to
compensate nonparty victims. 56 If this had happened, “[t]o award
compensatory damages to remedy such third-party harm might well
constitute a taking of property from the defendant without due process.” 57 Instead of serving a compensatory purpose in this case, however, the punitive damages award “serves the entirely different purposes of retribution and deterrence that underlie every criminal
sanction.” 58 To Stevens, this retributive purpose behind punitive
damages was even more important in this case because under Oregon law the award was payable in part to the State rather than to
the private litigant. 59
Justice Stevens took further issue with the majority’s distinction
between taking nonparty harm into account in order to assess reprehensibility—which is permitted—from taking nonparty harm into account in order to punish the defendant directly—which is forbidden.60
To Stevens, “[w]hen a jury increases a punitive damages award because injuries to third parties enhanced the reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct, the jury is by definition punishing the defendant—directly—for third-party harm.” 61
Despite the vocal dissents to this opinion, the majority spent little
time addressing the dissenters’ concerns. In the end, as the Oregon
Supreme Court had applied the wrong constitutional standard when

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1066-67.
Id. at 1067.
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considering Philip Morris’ appeal, the case was remanded for application of the correct standard set forth in the majority opinion. 62
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—STANDING—UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
TO DECIDE IF TAXPAYERS MAY CHALLENGE GOVERNMENT ACTION
VIOLATING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE WHEN ACTION IS FINANCED
BY UNEARMARKED TAXPAYER FUNDS—Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006)
The United States Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari in the case of Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
Inc. 63 The Court heard oral argument on February 28, 2007, and will
soon determine whether taxpayers have standing under Article III of
the Constitution to challenge government action that possibly violates the First Amendment’s establishment clause when the conduct
was financed by taxpayer money not specifically earmarked for the
challenged action. 64
In 2004, three members of the Freedom from Religion Foundation
filed a complaint in the United States District Court, Western District of Wisconsin, against Jim Towey, the director of White House
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (FBCI), as well as other directors of such offices spread throughout several federal agencies. 65
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ actions violated the principle of separation of church and state by using taxpayer money to
fund activities that promote religion, specifically conferences where
“faith-based organizations are singled out as particularly worthy of
federal funding because of their religious orientation.” 66
The conferences took place after President Bush’s formation of
FBCI, which was created through several executive orders. 67 The
Presidential orders provided for an official office for FBCI in the
White House as well as for centers within several federal departments. 68 Various executive branch agencies had held the challenged
conferences to promote FBCI. 69 However, the goal of these conferences was “to promote community organizations whether secular or
religious.” 70 The White House established the conferences to

62. Id. at 1065 (majority opinion).
63. 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006).
64. 433 F.3d 989, 990 (7th Cir. 2006).
65. Complaint at 1, Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th
Cir. 2006), available at http://ffrf.org/legal/faithbased_complaint.pdf.
66. Id. at 4, 5.
67. Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 993.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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provide participants with information about the Federal
funding process, available funding opportunities, and the requirements that come with the receipt of Federal funds . . .
[and] also provide an opportunity to inform State and local
officials about equal treatment regulations and other central
elements of the Faith-Based and Community Initiative. 71
After the plaintiffs alleged that the conferences were merely designed
to promote religious organizations over the secular organizations, the
trial court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue.
However, in a 2-1 opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision and ultimately
held that the taxpayers did have standing. 72 The plaintiffs alleged
that the conferences were funded by the government and therefore
based on an exercise of the Taxing and Spending Clause in addition
to the Establishment Clause, thus giving them standing as taxpayers. 73 The Government argued that the funding for the conferences
was provided by the President generally for the operation of his executive office and not directly by Congress; in reality, the objection
was to the President using the funds for these conferences and not to
Congress’s spending. 74
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, first delved into the
history of judicial limitation in the Cases and Controversies Clause of
Article III. 75 He examined Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion
in Coleman v. Miller, which stated that the framers of Article III
wanted courts to look at problems “only if a concrete, living contest
between adversaries called for the arbitrament of law” and limited
federal jurisdiction to “cases in which the plaintiff alleged the kind of
injury that would have supported a lawsuit in the eighteenth century.” 76 Future cases placed taxpayer standing outside the reach of
Article III because this would not have satisfied standing requirements in the eighteenth century. 77
However, Judge Posner stated, the concept of standing has
changed. 78 U.S. Supreme Court cases from the 1990s upheld standing for a variety of reasons primarily centered on voter status, such
as the standing to sue for lists of political action committee donors
and standing for voters challenging new congressional districts as

71. Id. (citing White House Conferences on Faith-Based and Community Initiatives,
http://www.dtiassociates.com/fbci/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2007).
72. Id. at 997.
73. Id. at 998.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 990.
76. Id. (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (concurring opinion)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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gerrymandering. 79 One recent case “assumed (without discussion)”
that the plaintiffs as voters and taxpayers had standing to dispute an
amendment that limited certain candidates on a ballot. 80
Judge Posner then went into general standing specifically for Establishment Clause cases. 81 He looked at American Civil Liberties
Union v. City of St. Charles 82 and Abington School District v.
Schempp 83 to determine how minimal standing requirements actually were for the Establishment Clause. 84 In St. Charles, taxpayers
brought suit to object to a cross on public property during Christmastime; the plaintiffs claimed they had to detour to avoid seeing the
cross. 85 The court held that detouring or “curtail[ing] of their use of
the public rights of way” was injurious enough for standing. 86 In
Schempp, parents complained that having their children read the Bible and recite the Lord’s Prayer in public schools violated the Establishment Clause. 87 The Schempp Court noted that the actual injury
could have been avoided by taking their children out of that specific
public school. 88 But, Judge Posner noted, the plaintiffs in both cases
still had standing to sue under the Establishment Clause, even with
options of avoiding the injury. 89
Judge Posner then discussed Flast v. Cohen, 90 a taxpayer challenge under the Establishment Clause. 91 In Flast, the plaintiffs complained that federal grant money had funded parochial schools, violating the Establishment Clause. 92 The Flast Court determined
standing on “prudential” principles instead of the actual injury to a
taxpayer from having his or her taxes used for an offensive purpose. 93 Prudential principals, a judge-made doctrine, “deny standing to someone who has been injured as a result of the defendant’s
conduct . . . but who is not the ‘right’ person to bring suit, maybe because someone has been injured more seriously and should be allowed to control the litigation.” 94 Because prudential principles of
standing are common law, they are still subject to change. 95 In Flast,
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 990-91.
Id. at 991.
794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 991.
Id. (citing St. Charles, 794 F.2d at 268).
Id.
Id. at 990 (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. 203).
Id.
Id. at 991.
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 991.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 992.
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the Court created a two-part test and stated that plaintiffs can challenge congressional exercises of taxing and spending power as long
as the expenditures are not “incidental” and the challenged exercise
goes beyond specific and not general constitutional limitations 96 —
“specific” because the Establishment Clause has a “specific” limitation on congressional expenditures for funding religion.97
Judge Posner then discussed and compared Bowen v. Kendrick 98
and ultimately decided Freedom from Religion Foundation would be
governed by Bowen. 99 In Bowen, the Court held that taxpayers did
have standing to attack the Adolescent Family Life Act, even though
grants had not been made by Congress itself. 100 The Adolescent Family Life Act was a congressional spending program administered by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 101 Bowen gave taxpayers standing even if a violation was not complete until the executive
branch acted. 102 A taxpayer had to show only that a statute was enacted “pursuant to Congress’s taxing and spending powers” and did
not necessarily have to show that a statute violated the Establishment Clause. 103 If it were actually proven that the conferences were
used as promotional tools for religion, it was possible that the defendants violated the Establishment Clause. 104
Judge Posner found that the difference between this case and
Flast and Bowen revolved around the type of expenditures. 105 The
Freedom from Religion Foundation plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that
the conferences were funded by expenditures from “appropriations,”
or from Congress’s spending power, and that these appropriations
were not earmarked for a specific purpose. 106 Therefore, funding had
to come from appropriations for the “general administrative expenses.” 107 The President, as well as other executive officials, had
some discretion over the use of this money. 108 In both Flast and Bowen, the expenditures in question were “specific congressional grant
programs,” while in the case at hand there was no actual “program,”
just generally appropriated money given to the executive branch. 109

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
487 U.S. 589 (1988).
Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 993.
Bowen, 487 U.S. 589.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 618-20.
Id.
Id. at 623-24.
Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 994.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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However, Judge Posner did not believe this difference should be
controlling. 110 He gave two examples of opposite extremes: first, if the
Secretary of Homeland Security used his general funds to build a
mosque because he believed that giving financial assistance to Islam
would reduce terrorism, taxpayer standing would not be essential to
bringing suit—but it would be inconsistent to give taxpayers standing in cases that only “slightly” violated the Establishment Clause
and not in cases where the violation was egregious. 111 Second, if the
President violated the Establishment Clause by positively referencing religion in his State of the Union address, a suit brought against
him would not involve an expenditure of any kind. 112 A taxpayer does
not have standing to challenge executive branch actions that do not
involve direct expenditures, even though almost all the activity of the
executive branch is funded by general appropriations. 113
Judge Posner reasoned that as the conferences give instructions to
religious organizations regarding how to apply for government
grants, the challenge was to the promotional tool (or to the conferences) and not the actual grants. 114 He noted that the line the government wanted to draw between the initiative and grants made because of that initiative would be “artificial”; executive officials could
still promote religion without giving outright grants. 115 He further
noted that the exception in Flast for “incidental” expenditures is relative. 116 Going back to the mosque example, the building of a mosque
would probably be “incidental” to the Department of Homeland Security’s budget of $30 billion. 117 “Incidental” does not necessarily mean
the cost relative to the size of the budget—if it did, taxpayer standing
would not exist. 118
Judge Posner also stated that taxpayers did not have standing to
attack an executive action funded by expenditures that were not consistent with congressional intent in allowing such expenditures. 119
This would make the courts a manager over the executive branch—a
job expressly reserved for Congress. 120 He ultimately held that taxpayers do have standing to attack executive actions financed generally by Congress if they are alleged to promote religion. 121

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 994-95.
Id. at 995.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 997.
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Judge Ripple wrote a dissent expounding on his belief that precedent did not allow “such a dramatic expansion of current standing
doctrine” by allowing taxpayers to sue based on executive branch
conduct as long as it was funded by a congressional appropriation. 122 Judge Ripple expressly noted that constitutional standing
had become a “well-established doctrine” and that the Seventh
Circuit, as an intermediate appellate court, could not change Supreme Court doctrine. 123
Judge Ripple focused his analysis on the concept of concrete injury. 124 He noted that standing was “rooted firmly” in Article III’s
Case or Controversy Clause. 125 The traditional test
requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to show
that he personally has suffered actual or threatened injury
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,
and that the injury can be traced to the challenged action
and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. 126
This test should be construed rigorously, as noted in Flast v.
Cohen. 127 Taxpayers may challenge only congressional powers exercised under the Taxing and Spending Clause, found in Article I. 128
They must also show a “logical link” or nexus between these challenged
congressional powers and taxpayer status129 and show a nexus between
taxpayer status and the actual constitutional infringement.130
Judge Ripple focused on the nexus between the taxpayers and the
challenged congressional powers. 131 Before doing so, he examined
why the Supreme Court would want this connection to be examined
so closely. 132 Judge Ripple observed that taxpayer status has always
stood on shaky ground in terms of constitutional standing, particularly due to taxpayers bringing suits for undifferentiated injuries, or
“mere disagreement[s] with the government policy.” 133 The trend in
the Supreme Court’s decisions indicated that many complaints were
not really about the Taxing and Spending Clause, he declared, but
other clauses such as the Account Clause, the Incompatibility

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Valley Forge Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
127. Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-103 (1968)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 997-98.
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Clause, and the Property Clause. 134 As a result, the Supreme Court
denied each of these taxpayers standing. 135 This case was based on
the Establishment Clause, which does restrict Congress’s power to
spend, but Judge Ripple decided the proper inquiry was whether it
was based on the Taxing and Spending Clause. 136
Judge Ripple first analyzed Flast and its subsequent holdings regarding the subject. 137 Taxpayer standing is merely a small exception
to the prohibition of generalized grievances, and to allow taxpayers
to challenge general government fund expenditures in addition to
specific expenditures would significantly widen the exception. 138 Taxpayer standing exists only so expenditure and tax violations of the
Establishment Clause may be remedied and because the Clause is so
difficult to enforce. 139 The Supreme Court has allowed standing for
taxpayers to make “specific objections linked to a specific exercise of
the taxing and spending power on the ground that it violates the Establishment Clause.” 140 After Flast and subsequent cases, plaintiffs
must challenge expenditures “made in the exercise of Congress’ taxing and spending power” and directing attention to an executive
branch program does not qualify. 141
Judge Ripple also looked at Bowen in his analysis. 142 In Bowen,
the Court stated that the Adolescent Family Life Act was really a
“disbursement of funds pursuant to Congress’ taxing and spending
powers” and the fact that certain executive officials actually disbursed the money did not matter. 143 The Bowen Court interpreted the
“touchstone” of Flast to be whether the executive official had authority under the challenged statute to administer spending programs
created by Congress. 144 Judge Ripple disagreed with Judge Posner
and Judge Wood that Bowen enlarged the concept of taxpayer standing by permitting plaintiffs to show that a general congressional appropriations statute allowed executive branch officials to violate the
Establishment Clause because it would allow any taxpayer to bring a

134. Id. at 998; see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (rejecting standing based on the Property
Clause); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (rejecting
standing based on the Incompatibility Clause); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974) (rejecting standing based on the Account Clause).
135. Freedom from Religion Found.¸ 433 F.3d at 998.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 998-99.
141. Id. at 1000.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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suit against any executive action. 145 Judge Ripple felt that Bowen did
not authorize the judiciary to question executive actions at the request of someone who cannot show a specific connection to the action. 146 He specifically noted that “[t]he executive can do nothing
without general budget appropriations from Congress.”147
Judge Ripple stated that the majority broadened the concept of
taxpayer standing so that it could not be distinguished from the
other forms of standing the Supreme Court has decided were “destructive of the case or controversy limitation on the power of the federal courts to intrude into the decision-making prerogatives of the
executive branch.” 148 He also noted that the decision brought the circuit out of line from the other circuits. 149
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FIRST AMENDMENT—A STUDENT’S RIGHT TO
DISPLAY A BANNER AT AN EVENT DURING SCHOOL HOURS ACROSS THE
STREET FROM THE SCHOOL—Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th
Cir. 2006)
On March 19, 2007, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
arguments for Frederick v. Morse, 150 a First Amendment case originating out of the Ninth Circuit. The case involves the First Amendment rights of Joseph Frederick, then a high school senior at JuneauDouglas High School in Juneau, Alaska. 151 The Supreme Court
granted writ of certiorari for the case on March 5, 2007. 152 Famed
Clinton-era former independent counsel Kenneth Starr argued the
case on behalf of Principal Deborah Morse, whom the Ninth Circuit
determined could be personally liable to Frederick for her actions.153
The Supreme Court’s decision may have far-reaching consequences
for both the First Amendment rights of students and the ability of
school administrators to punish unwanted speech. This Note will
fully explore the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
One January day the Olympic Torch was scheduled to pass the
Juneau-Douglas High School (High School). 154 The High School let
students out of classes to watch the torch pass. 155 The event, called
the “Winter Olympics Torch Relay,” was sponsored by various com145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1000-01.
150. 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006).
151. Id. at 1115.
152. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 722 (2007).
153. CNN, Justices Hear ‘Bong Hits for Jesus’ Case (Mar. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/03/19/scotus.bonghits.ap/index.html.
154. Frederick, 39 F.3d at 1115.
155. Id.
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panies, including Coca-Cola. 156 Frederick arrived at school late because he was stuck in the snow, which meant he showed only in time
to come to the event. 157 Frederick met with some friends on the sidewalk across from the High School. 158 Frederick waited until TV cameras were within range and then displayed a banner that read “Bong
Hits for Jesus.” 159 Various fights and other roughhousing amongst
the students occurred before Frederick unveiled the banner.160 Principal Morse saw the banner, crossed the street, took the banner from
him, and crumpled it up. 161 Immediately before Morse took the banner, Frederick “asked ‘What about the Bill of Rights and freedom of
speech?’ ” 162 Morse responded that “she ‘felt that it violated the policy
against displaying offensive material, including material that advertises or promotes use of illegal drugs.’ ” 163 Frederick was suspended
for ten days, and he unsuccessfully appealed his suspension. 164 Frederick then filed a § 1983 complaint in federal court, claiming his
First Amendment rights had been violated. 165 The district court
granted summary judgment for Morse, holding that no constitutional right had been violated and that if one had been violated,
Morse had qualified immunity. 166 Frederick then filed his appeal
with the Ninth Circuit. 167
The Ninth Circuit first answered whether this should be a school
case at all, as an amicus brief had argued that as Frederick was on a
public sidewalk and not in school, his case should be treated as
such. 168 However, without much discussion, the Ninth Circuit determined that this was a school case because school was in session
and the High School did maintain supervision over the students to
some extent. 169
After concluding that this was a school speech case, the court
noted that
[t]he school principal and school board [did] not claim that
the display disrupted or was expected to disrupt any classroom work. They concede[d] that their objection to the display, and the reason why the principal ripped down the ban156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1115-16.
Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1116.
Id.
Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1115-17.
Id. at 1116-17.
Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1117.
Id.
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ner, was not concern that it would cause disruption but that
its message would be understood as advocating or promoting
illegal drug use. 170
Although Frederick maintained that the message was not advocating
illegal drug use and was instead just a nonsensical phrase, the court
conducted its analysis assuming that the message expressed positive
sentiments towards illegal drug use.171
With the above concessions and facts in mind, the Ninth Circuit
proceeded to analyze the First Amendment claim, framing the issue
in the following way: “whether a school may, in the absence of concern about disruption of educational activities, punish and censor
non-disruptive, off-campus speech by students during schoolauthorized activities because the speech promotes a social message
contrary to the one favored by the school.” 172 The underlying legal issue that decided the case was how the court chose to categorize the
speech, or more specifically, what case law the court believed was
applicable. The Ninth Circuit believed this to be a Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District 173 case, while Morse
argued it was either a Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 174 or
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 175 case.
In Tinker, students wore black arm bands to protest the war. 176
“Tinker held that ‘the prohibition of expression of one particular
opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not
constitutionally permissible.’ ” 177
In Fraser, a student was punished after giving a speech for a candidate for student office. 178 The speech, heavily laden with sexual innuendo, was given at a school assembly, and disruption immediately
ensued. 179 The court believed that “Fraser focuses upon the sexual
nature of the offensiveness in the in-school speech that can be punished, as contrasted with the ‘political viewpoint’ of the speech protected in Tinker.” 180 Furthermore, Fraser protects the school’s ability
to protect its basic educational mission. 181

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id. at 1117-18.
Id. at 1118.
89 S. Ct. 733 (1969).
106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
Frederick, 39 F.3d at 1118.
Id. (quoting Tinker, 89 S. Ct. at 740).
Id. at 1119.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1120.
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In Kuhlmeier, a school-run newspaper attempted to publish an article that dealt with pregnancy and divorce. 182 Because the newspaper was run by the school and was part of the school curriculum,
the newspaper’s speech was an affirmative promotion by the
school of the student author’s speech, a promotion the First
Amendment does not require. 183
The Ninth Circuit believed this case to be a Tinker case. 184 The
School Board, which was also a defendant, had argued that punishment was consistent with enforcing the High School’s mission in opposing illegal drug use. 185 The student in Tinker was opposing a war,
which, according to the Ninth Circuit, was opposition to the most important governmental mission, winning a war. 186 Tinker allows censorship or punishment towards student speech only when the school
can “show a reasonable concern about the likelihood of substantial
disruption to its educational mission.”187
The court believed that Fraser did not apply for several reasons. 188
First, Fraser focused on the “sexual nature” of the speech, which was
“plainly offensive” and caused disruption of a school assembly. 189 On
the other hand, Frederick’s speech was not sexual in nature and did
not disrupt a school assembly. 190 Not only was Frederick’s speech not
“plainly offensive,” but in a state where legalizing marijuana is often
at issue, it very well could have been political speech in the same
vein as Tinker. 191 Additionally, Tinker does not allow a school to define its mission in any way it sees fit and then punish students who
oppose this mission. 192 Instead, Fraser adds to Tinker the notion that
schools can punish speech that disrupts its educational function,
which did not occur in this case. 193
The court distinguished Kuhlmeier in an even quicker fashion,
reasoning that Frederick’s banner “was not sponsored or endorsed by
the school, nor was it part of the curriculum, nor did it take place as
part of an official school activity.” 194 The court thought that Kuhl182. Id. at 1119.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1118.
185. Id. at 1119.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1123.
188. Id. at 1119.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1120 (citing various examples where a school’s mission could not interfere
with legitimate First Amendment rights, such as a school’s anti-alcohol message being undermined by a student e-mailing medical reports to other students showing the health
benefits of alcohol).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1119.
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meier may have applied had Frederick insisted on creating the banner in a school art class; however, that was not the case.195
The School Board and Morse pointed to Boroff v. Van Wert City
Board of Education, 196 a Sixth Circuit case that upheld a school dress
code that prohibited wearing Marilyn Manson T-shirts, some of
which contained pro-drug and anti-religious messages. 197 The Sixth
Circuit read Fraser in a way that gave wide discretion to schools to
determine the appropriateness of messages at school, concluding that
the T-shirts could be banned because they were contrary to the
school’s educational mission. 198 The Frederick court declined to follow
Boroff to the extent that Boroff implies that a school can regulate
speech “as ‘plainly offensive’ whenever it conflicts with a vaguelydefined ‘educational mission.’ ” 199 The Frederick court further believed that Fraser did not give schools the right to prohibit any
speech that is “offensive,” meaning that “offensive” speech did not
automatically switch the analysis from Tinker to Fraser. 200 By the
School Board’s and Morse’s standard, the High School could prohibit
Frederick from distributing copies of an Alaskan Supreme Court decision upholding the right to possession of marijuana, when the case
was distributed across the street from the school. 201 Instead, “Fraser
only enables schools to prevent the sort of vulgar, obscene, lewd, or
sexual speech that, especially with adolescents, readily promotes disruption and diversion from the educational curriculum.” 202
After determining that this case was properly decided under
Tinker, the court determined that because Morse punished the
speech not to stop disruption of its educational mission but because
the speech disrupted the High School’s anti-drug message, the punishment failed the Tinker test and thus violated Frederick’s First
Amendment rights. 203
As previously noted, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision will likely
have far-reaching consequences for both students and school officials.
Although this Note does not offer a prediction as to the outcome, the
holding will likely hinge on whether the Court decides to follow the
Sixth Circuit’s or the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Fraser. It
seems likely that the conservatives on the Court will side with the
195. Id. at 1119-20.
196. 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).
197. Frederick, 39 F.3d at 1122.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1123. The court also went on to determine that the defendants did not have
qualified immunity and could be subject to money damages because Frederick’s rights
were clearly established under the applicable precedent. Id. at 1123-25.
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Sixth Circuit and hold that Fraser gives wide discretion to schools to
determine its educational mission, while the liberals on the Court
will likely side with the Frederick court and hold that Fraser is limited to sexual speech that causes a real disruption to the school’s basic educational mission.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—THE POLICE DO NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE
TO ARREST A CITIZEN UNDER A STATUTE THAT HASN’T BEEN RULED
UNCONSITUTIONAL, IF THE STATUTE ON ITS FACE WOULD BE
CONSTRUED UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY A REASONABLE PERSON—Leonard
v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2007)
Thomas Leonard appealed the summary judgment granted to the
defendant, police officer Stephen Robinson, by the federal district
court in a civil rights action resulting from Leonard’s arrest at a
township board meeting. 204 The district court dismissed the wrongful
arrest civil case against Robinson, holding that he was protected by
qualified immunity and that Leonard “could not make out a prima
facie case” on his claim that his First Amendment rights were violated by an improper motive of the officer. 205 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling, stating that it overlooked
the application of the First Amendment to the state statute used to
charge Leonard and ignored evidence which may have shown that
Robinson had an improper motive. 206 The court of appeals held that
“no reasonable officer would have found probable cause to arrest
Leonard solely for uttering ‘God damn’ while addressing the township board,” as this type of debate is clearly protected by the First
Amendment. 207 The court additionally held that Leonard’s retaliation
claim survived summary judgment, as the motive for the arrest was
a genuine issue of material fact that should be heard by a jury.208
Leonard’s wife, Sara, operated a towing company, Auto Works, in
Montrose, Michigan, until 2000. 209 Around that time, the Montrose
police chief, Chief Abraham, was in the process of trying to extend
the jurisdiction of the police force.210 Sarah’s mother was a member of
the city council that heard the proposal brought by the police chief,
and she opposed the plan. 211 “Abraham asked Sarah to lobby her
mother in support of the plan. In return, he offered [that] Auto
Works could continue to tow for the Township. When Sarah refused,
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Auto Works lost its business with the Township.” 212 Sarah sued the
town and Abraham for violating her First Amendment rights, and a
settlement was later reached; however, before the settlement was
reached Leonard and his wife attended a Township Board meeting.213
Also at this meeting was Officer Robinson, who testified that Abraham ordered him to attend the meeting. 214 Leonard believed Abraham sent Robinson so that if given the chance, he would arrest Sarah
in retaliation for the suit against Abraham. 215 “As a result of the lawsuit, according to Leonard, Chief Abraham hated him and his
wife.” 216 At the meeting, Robinson was asked by another attendee
why he was at the meeting and lied by stating that “I’d like to see
what’s going on.” 217
At the meeting, during a portion known as “citizen time,” Leonard
was given the opportunity to speak, and he began by saying that he
and his wife were being treated unfairly by the town. 218 A short conversation between Leonard and a board member followed, and before
it ended Leonard used the phrase “God damn” and then sat down; he
was then told by the board member to not use God’s name in vain. 219
Leonard responded to this statement by telling the board member
that he could do whatever he wanted, and then he was interrupted
by Robinson. 220 Leonard told Robinson to leave him alone, and Robinson replied that he was going to take Leonard with him. 221 Robinson then took Leonard outside and placed him under arrest.222
Leonard was charged with violating of Michigan laws applying to
disorderly persons and obscenity, but one month later the citation
was voided. 223 Leonard later filed suit against Officer Robinson in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, “alleging that Robinson, under color of law, violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizure. The complaint also
raised three state law torts: battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment.” 224 Robinson moved for summary judgment, asserting that
he was protected by qualified immunity on the constitutional claims
and that the state law claims should be dismissed because the arrest

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was supported by probable cause. 225 Leonard responded by defending
his claims on a First Amendment retaliation theory. 226 The district
court ruled in favor of Robinson, granting summary judgment. 227
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de
novo, as the main issues in the case were questions of law.228 The
overriding issue addressed by the court was the
question of whether an arrest for obscenity, vulgarity, or disturbing the peace, when based upon speech and not conduct,
is valid when it occurs during a democratic assembly
where there is no evidence that the individual arrested
was out of order and some evidence of improper motive by
the arresting officer. 229
The court first examined whether Robinson’s defense of qualified
immunity protected him from civil liability. 230 The court’s analysis
continued with a review of whether Robinson had probable cause under state law to arrest Leonard. 231 The court stated that qualified
immunity protects public officials from civil liability unless their
conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 232 The court
noted that, viewing the issue in the light most favorable to the injured party, it must determine whether a constitutional right was

225. Id. In his motion for summary judgment, to show probable cause for the arrest,
Robinson claimed there were four statutes that Leonard violated: Michigan Compiled Laws
sections 750.103 (cursing and swearing), 750.170 (disturbance of lawful meetings), 750.167
(disorderly person), and 750.337 (obscenity).
226. Leonard, 477 F.3d at 352.
227. Id. at 353.
The district court held that Robinson did not violate the Fourth Amendment because he had probable cause to arrest Leonard. The court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. . . .
The district court denied Leonard’s First Amendment retaliation claim by
holding that there was no “causal connection between Plaintiff’s protected
speech and his arrest.” . . . The court refused to make reasonable inferences favorable to Leonard’s claims. Instead, it ignored his allegations regarding Robinson’s motive for the arrest, the previous lawsuit by Leonard’s wife, and Robinson’s inconsistent statements and held that “there is absolutely no evidence of
any improper motive.” The district court concluded that it was illegal to “use [ ]
objectionable language and become [ ] somewhat belligerent during a public
meeting,” and that Leonard should have just calmed down and not made a federal case of it.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 351. The facts of what happened were to be construed in the light most favorable to Leonard. Id.
230. Id. at 354.
231. Id. at 355.
232. Id. at 354 (quoting Estate of Carter v. Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 310-11 (6th Cir.
2005) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))).
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violated and whether that right is clearly established. 233 “For a right
to be clearly established, the ‘contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing violates that right.’ ” 234
The court held that Robinson inhibited First Amendment freedoms that have been clearly established for a generation, thus precluding “a finding of probable cause because the laws cited by Robinson are either facially invalid, vague, or overbroad when applied to
speech (as opposed to conduct) at a democratic assembly where the
speaker is not out of order.” 235 The court further noted that the facts
of the case represented the universally perceived First Amendment
protection of the free discussion of governmental affairs. 236 The First
Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” 237 The court declared that even the narrowest interpretation
of the rights protected under freedom of speech would include the
holding that one should refrain from interrupting or regulating
speech in a democratic forum such as a town meeting.238
The court then looked at the four sections of Michigan’s Penal
Code that Robinson claimed gave him probable cause for the arrest. 239 The first statute that Leonard was accused of violating was
section 750.337, Michigan Compiled Laws, “regulating speech in the
presence of women or children.” 240 The court held that Leonard’s vio233. Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)); see also Groh v. Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551, 563-64 (2004) (noting that reasonable public officials should know the law
governing their conduct).
234. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “For a plaintiff to
state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, he must show that the injury was material,
‘that his conduct was constitutionally protected,’ and that it was a ‘motivating factor’ behind the government’s actions.” Id. at 355 (quoting Adair v. Charter County of Wayne, 452
F.3d 482, 492 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal citation omitted).
235. Id. at 356.
236. Id. (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.” (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 369 (1931))).
237. Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
238. Id. The court noted the long-standing precedent of courts finding that constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political and that even
if speech is political, there may be a few exceptions when it may be limited, such as when it
entails the use of fighting words or when the social interest outweighs the right of free
speech. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (This law stated that “[a]ny person who shall use any indecent, immoral, obscene, vulgar or insulting language in the presence or hearing of any woman or child shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor.”).
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lation of this law did not create probable cause, as this law had been
ruled unconstitutional in prior decisions. 241 The court explained how
this law had been determined to be constitutionally vague, as it delegated “basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis [and created the danger of]
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 242 The court opined that
it would be hard to envision a more vague statute than the one before
it and that the language within the statute outlawing “insulting language” would subject many people to the threat of misdemeanor
prosecution without knowledge of what constituted a violation. 243
The court noted that the constitutionality of the other three statutes relied upon by Robinson had not been as “clearly or directly” examined by Michigan courts as had section 750.337. 244 Adding that a
police officer’s duty is to enforce laws “until and unless they are declared unconstitutional,” 245 the court further stated that the passing
of a law by the legislature eliminates the need for speculation by the
police as to whether the statute is constitutional except when the law
is so clearly and blatantly unconstitutional that any reasonable person would be hard pressed to not see the flaws. 246 The court explained that when looking at the facts “in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, no reasonable police officer would believe that any of
the three other Michigan statutes relied upon by the district court
are constitutional as applied to Leonard’s political speech during a
democratic assembly.” 247
The court then discussed why the other three statutes could not
support probable cause as applied to Leonard’s speech. 248 Section
750.167 defines “disorderly person,” in part, as “[a] person who is engaged in indecent or obscene conduct in a public place.” 249 The court
explained that the plain language of the statute regulates conduct
and not speech; the statute reads as regulating indecent conduct
such as the exposing of one’s body parts. Even if speech was not
meant to be regulated by this statute, however, the statute would be

241. Id. at 358.
242. Id. The court explained that “in order to pass constitutional muster, a penal statute must define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. (quoting People v. Boomer, 655 N.W.2d 255, 258
(Mich. Ct. App. 2002)).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 358-59.
245. Id. at 359.
246. Id. (“Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.”).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 356.
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similar to section 750.337, which as noted before has been ruled to be
flagrantly unconstitutional. 250
The court further explained that Leonard’s conduct could not be
punished under section 750.103, which makes “profanely curs[ing] or
damn[ing] or swear[ing] by the name of God, Jesus Christ or the
Holy Ghost a crime.” 251 The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in Cohen v. California 252 that a state may not make the use of a
“single four letter expletive” a crime and that there is no distinction
between the facts in Cohen and the ones found in this case. 253 The
court also noted that the use of the phrase “God damn” by Leonard
during his political speech did not fall under the category of fighting words. Thus, the court held, barring Leonard from using the
expletive in his display of political speech during a town meeting
was unconstitutional. 254
The last statute the court examined was section 750.103, prohibiting “[a]ny person [from making or exciting] any disturbance or contention . . . at any . . . public meeting where citizens are peaceably
and lawfully assembled.” 255 The court noted that this statute had already been ruled to be overbroad by the Michigan Court of Appeals,
which held that the phrase “excite any contention” must be stricken
from the statute for the law to be constitutional, 256 adding that there
was no conduct exhibited by Leonard that would be prohibited under
this statute. 257
After elaborating on why there was no probable cause for Leonard’s arrest under Michigan statutes, the court explained why it
disagreed with the dissent’s statement that, as the record contained
a video of the incident, certain facts were undisputed. 258 The judge
writing for the majority stated that he viewed the video and came to
a different conclusion personally, but, more importantly, believed
that a rational juror may come up with a different conclusion. 259 The
majority concluded that this “judgment means that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Leonard’s conduct could con-

250. Id. at 359.
251. Id.
252. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
253. Id. (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16 (where “the defendant was observed in the Los
Angeles County Courthouse . . . wearing a jacket bearing the words ‘Fuck the Draft’ ”)).
254. Id. at 359-60.
255. Id. at 360.
256. Id. (citing People v. Purifoy, 191 N.W.2d 63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (finding that the
statute was meant to deal with intentional acts of violence and holding that for someone to
be punished under this statute, the activity must be shown to present a threat to public
welfare)).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 361.
259. Id.
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stitutionally be considered criminal by any rational officer.” 260 Before
looking at the retaliation claim, the majority stated that the facts in
this case could lead a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Leonard
did not disrupt the peace. 261 The court therefore held
that no reasonable officer would [have found] that probable
cause exist[ed] to arrest a recognized speaker at a chaired
public assembly based solely on the content of his speech (albeit vigorous or blasphemous) unless and until the speaker
[was] determined to be out of order by the individual chairing the assembly. 262
The court finished its opinion by discussing why the district
court’s analysis of the retaliation claim was also flawed. 263 The court
noted that the district court never considered whether Leonard’s
speech at the town meeting was protected and that the lower court
wrongly assumed that all the statutes listed by Robinson were valid,
as no court had specifically struck them down.264 The court also noted
that the district court failed to look at the evidence relevant to Leonard’s claim that Robinson had a motive in making the arrest. 265 The
dispute between the police chief and the Leonard family and that another attendee stated that the officer lied about why he was attending the meeting, along with a lawsuit being filed before the town
meeting, was evidence that Leonard may have been arrested in retaliation for constitutionally protected conduct. 266 The court concluded by holding “that Leonard . . . set out a prima facie case of
First Amendment retaliation and . . . created a genuine issue of
material fact.” 267
The dissenting judge felt that Robinson had probable cause to arrest Leonard, reasoning that while he believed the four statutes used
as support for the arrest may indeed be unconstitutional, he was “not
prepared to accept [the majority’s] judgment that the Supreme
Court, our court or the Michigan courts [have] clearly established the
unconstitutionality of all four of [the] duly enacted laws before this
incident.” 268 The dissent further stated that although section 750.337
had been ruled unconstitutional, he was not ready to find that the
other three statutes would be found by a reasonable person to have
been ruled unconstitutional by the courts. 269 For example, the dissent
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id.
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noted, section 750.170 (“Disturbance of lawful meetings”) had withstood several constitutional challenges, including one in the past
couple of decades, and even if Robinson had looked the statute up before arriving at the meeting, he would not have reasonably known
that it was “clearly established” that he should not enforce it in this
type of setting. 270 The dissent reasoned that as “the Supreme Court
[and the majority of other district courts have] never rejected a claim
of qualified immunity to a police officer who enforced a statute that
had not been declared unconstitutional at the time of the citizenpolice encounter,” the three statutes which had not been directly
found to be in violation of the constitution were enough to grant
probable cause for the arrest. 271 The dissent further stated that “[t]he
First Amendment properly protected Leonard from being prosecuted for his unruly speech and conduct—and for now that is
enough[, and that to] expose Robinson to money damages for enforcing these laws . . . seems unfair.” 272 The dissenting judge concluded
by stating that he believed the retaliation claim was moot as well, as
there was probable cause; even if there weren’t probable cause, Robinson had done nothing more than try to restore order to a meeting
that was getting out of hand, and Leonard had failed to show any
concrete evidence that the police were out to get him. 273
HABEAS CORPUS—CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS—Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld (Hamdan 2), 464 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006)
On the heels of the complex, controversial opinion from the United
States Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 1, 274 the District
Court for the District of Columbia, Judge Robertson, again faced the
difficult questions encircling military commissions, enemy combatants, and the jurisdiction of federal courts. Quite familiar by now
with the facts in Hamdan, Judge Robertson recalled:
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was taken into United
States military custody in Afghanistan in November 2001. He was
transported to the Defense Department’s detention facility at
270. Id. at 364.
271. Id. at 365.
The dissenting judge reasoned that “Leonard not only asks . . . to take a road
less traveled but one never traveled. It is one thing to credit police officers with
knowledge of all statutory and constitutional rulings potentially bearing on all
statutes they enforce; but this necessary requirement needlessly loses any connection with reality when we hold police officers to the standard of anticipating
a court’s later invalidation of a statute that was duly enacted by legislators sworn
to uphold the Constitution, that is presumed constitutional, that has been on the
books for 75 years and that has withstood two constitutional challenges.”
Id. at 367.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan 1), 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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Guantanamo Bay in June 2002. In July 2003, the President declared him eligible for trial by military commission. On April 6,
2004, Hamdan petitioned for mandamus or habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. On July 13, 2004, after having been held for about two years
and eight months without formal charges, Hamdan was finally
charged at Guantanamo Bay with a single count of conspiracy. In
August 2004, his habeas petition was transferred to this court.
On November 8, 2004, I granted Hamdan’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus after finding that he could not be tried lawfully before a military commission that had not been approved by Congress, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152 (D.D.C.2004). That
decision was reversed by a panel of the D.C. Circuit on July 15,
2005, 415 F.3d 33, in a decision that was itself reversed a year
later by the Supreme Court, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, [], 126 S.Ct.
2749, [] (2006), four justices noting that “[n]othing prevents the
President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary” to lawfully try enemy combatants, Id. at 2799,
(Breyer, J., concurring). On September 22, 2006, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to me “for further proceedings.” The remand order contained no instructions, nor was it clear what proceedings, if any, would be possible –for, by that time, the President
had indeed “return[ed] to Congress,” and he had asked Congress to
strip the federal courts of their jurisdiction to hear any habeas petitions of the Guantanamo detainees.
On September 29, 2006 Congress enacted, and . . . the President
signed, the Military Commissions Act . . . which amends the federal habeas statute by removing jurisdiction of any ‘court, judge, or
justice’ over habeas petitions and all other actions filed by aliens
who are either detained as enemy combatants or are ‘awaiting
such determination.’ [“The day after the MCA became law, the
government filed, in each of the 181 Guantanamo habeas cases
pending in this Court, a Notice of Military Commissions Act of
2006 [seeking dismissal], highlighting the jurisdiction-stripping
and retroactivity provisions of the Act.”] 275

After recounting the facts, the district court construed Hamdan’s
claim as presenting three fundamental questions: (1) did the Military
Commissions Act successfully remove statutory habeas jurisdiction
over detainees like Hamdan; (2) if it did, is the Act constitutionally
valid as a suspension 276 of the writ of habeas corpus; and (3) does
Hamdan have a constitutional writ of habeas corpus that survives
the Act? 277

275. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan 2), 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
276. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (the Suspension Clause).
277. Hamdan 2, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 11.
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First, the district court concluded that the Military Commissions
Act clearly intended to remove statutory habeas jurisdiction for detainees such as Hamdan. Although the standard for such clarity is
high—“Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory
directives to effect a repeal [of jurisdiction]” 278 —section 7(a) and (b) of
the Military Commissions Act provided such unambiguous directives. 279 Because the language of the Act was “so clear that it could
sustain only one interpretation” 280 —and that interpretation was that
no statutory jurisdiction remained for Hamdan—the court concluded
the Act had foreclosed statutory habeas. 281
Next the court turned to the second question: whether the Military Commissions Act was a valid suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. After tracing the history of the Great Writ from the fourteenth century to the present as “a guardian of liberty,” 282 the court
turned to the language and jurisprudence of the Suspension
Clause. 283 “Although [the Suspension Clause] does not state that suspension must be effected by, or authorized by, a legislative act, it has
been so understood, consistent with English practice and the
Clause’s placement in Article I.” 284 In fact, Congress has authorized
executive suspension of the writ of habeas corpus only four times in
278. Id. (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001)).
279. Id. at 11-12. Section 7 of the Act states:
a) IN GENERAL.-Section 2241 of title 28, United States Code [the habeas
statute], is amended by . . .
inserting the following new subsection (e):
(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained
by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note), no court, justice, or judge
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United
States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment,
trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the
United States and has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendment made by subsection (a) shall
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all
cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of
this Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment,
trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States
since September 11, 2001.
Hamdan 2, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 11-12.
280. Hamdan 2, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 329 n.4
(1997)).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 13.
283. Id. at 14. The Suspension Clause states: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.” Id. (quoting Article I, section 9, clause 2).
284. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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its history, and each such suspension “occurred during times of indisputable, and congressionally declared, rebellion or invasion.” 285
Though noting that there are aspects of the Suspension Clause that
are still somewhat open questions, 286 the court concluded that the
protection of the writ is “absolute in the absence of ‘invasion’ or ‘rebellion.’ Neither . . . was occurring at the time the MCA was enacted.” 287 As Congress “made no findings of the predicate conditions
[of invasion or rebellion], as it did [in each of the prior four suspensions of the writ,]” 288 the court concluded that “Congress itself must
not have thought that it was ‘suspending’ the writ with the enactment of the MCA.” 289 Thus, the Great Writ survived the Military
Commissions Act and, “to the extent [it] operates to make the writ
unavailable to a person who is constitutionally entitled to it, it must
be unconstitutional.” 290
Finally, the court turned to the third question: is Hamdan entitled
to the constitutional writ that survives the Act? To answer this question, the court had to determine whether the Great Writ was available to an alien in the factual contours of Hamdan’s detention. Looking to past cases, the court held that habeas had been granted only to
an alien that had “a significant relationship to the country in which
the writ was sought.” 291 The court also noted that no prior, applicable
cases had held an alien “captured abroad and detained outside the
United States—or in [territory the U.S. controls]—had a . . . constitutionally protected right to the writ of habeas corpus.” 292 Because
Hamdan did not reside “lawfully or unlawfully on American soil” 293
nor did he “become a part of the population enough to separate himself from the common law tradition generally barring non-resident
enemy aliens from accessing courts in wartime,” Hamdan was not
entitled to the Great Writ. 294 The court summed up the third question by stating that “Hamdan’s lengthy detention beyond American
borders but within the jurisdictional authority of the United States is
historically unique[, but n]evertheless . . . his connection to the
United States lacks the geographical and volitional predicates necessary to claim a constitutional right to habeas corpus.” 295 So, while the
285. Hamdan 2, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 14, 15.
286. “The Supreme Court has never decided whether an Act of Congress alone has effectively ‘suspended’ the writ. . . . [I]ndeed, the Court has carefully avoided saying exactly
what the Suspension Clause protects.” Id. at 15.
287. Id. at 16.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 17.
292. Id. (quoting Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004)).
293. Id.
294. Id. (relying in part on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
295. Id. at 18.
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Military Commissions Act had not suspended the Great Writ, it had
modified statutory habeas jurisdiction, and therefore Hamdan’s only
access to habeas corpus, and thus to the District Court, would come
through the Constitution. Here, his “lawful but involuntary [presence] is not the sort to indicate any substantial connections with our
country that would justify the invocation of a constitutional right to
habeas corpus.” 296 Thus, Hamdan was denied access to federal court.
Although Hamdan was denied habeas corpus access to federal
court, given the highly pertinent legal issues involved, this is likely
just the beginning of another round of appeals—a round that may
well again find its way to the Supreme Court.

296. Id. (citation omitted).

